Empirical Household Finance Online PhD-Level Class

Mortgage Borrowing and Default

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Plan For My Presentation Today

• Some observations on today's topic:

Mortgage Borrowing and Default


• Present a research paper:

Asymmetric Information about Collateral Values

Mortgages: Largest Consumer Credit Category

Total Debt Balance and its Composition

Trillions of Dollars



Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax

Mortgages: Large and Important Credit Class



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Mortgages: Large and Important Credit Class



Dimensions of Mortgages

• Mortgages potentially differ on many dimensions

- FRM/ARM
- Leverage
- Duration
- Teaser rate
- Government insured?
- Recourse/Non-recourse (US: State-level laws)

- What determines which mortgages individuals pick?
 - Which lender? How much leverage? ARM/FRM?
 - House price beliefs (e.g., Bailey, Davila, Kuchler, and Stroebel, 2019)?
 - Peer effects (e.g., McCartney and Shah, 2016)
 - Role of intermediaries such as mortgage brokers (e.g., Robles-Garcia, 2020)
 - Do borrowers search appropriately (e.g., Woodward and Hall, 2012)

- Why do individuals default on mortgages?
 - Liquidity Defaults vs. Strategic Defaults (e.g., Ganong and Noel, 2020)
 - Peer effects (e.g., Gupta, 2019; Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, 2013)
 - Information about cost of defaulting
 - Direct effect on social stigma cost
 - Depends on legal environment (recourse/non-recourse)

- What determines mortgage refinancing behavior?
 - Particularly relevant for fixed rate mortgages
 - Expectations of future interest rate changes
 - Peer effects (see Jordan Nickerson's presentation from a while ago)
 - Other frictions: The need to prove income may prohibit welfare-improving refis
 - Important implications for functioning of monetary policy
 - Government programs such as HAMP/HARP

- Information Friction in Mortgage Markets
 - Adverse Selection vs Moral Hazard
 - Source: Borrower Types (Hansman and Gupta, 2020)
 - Source: Collateral Values (Stroebel, 2015)

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- Optimal mortgage design
 - FRM/ARM: Who is best placed to bear interest rate risk?
 - State-dependent repayment (e.g., vary with house prices to avoid strategic defaults)

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- Government intervention in the mortgage market?
 - Leverage regulation (Johnson, Mondragon, DeFusco, 2020; Benetton, 2020)
 - GSEs (Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac): Guarantee certain MBS
 - Crisis interventions: HAMP/HARP; Fed purchasing MBS